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NOTES
THE LEGAL REMEDIES FOR ELECTRICAL INTERFERENCE WITH
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH LINES-From its inception, the tele-

phone has been largely applied to local use in cities and its wires located on the city streets. With the advent of the use of electricity as
motive power for street railways in the period between 1885 and 189o,
its service was seriously impaired, giving rise to the earliest disputes
concerning electrical interference.
The two types of electrical interference with which we are here
concerned are those caused by conduction and induction. Originally
the telephone companies used the ground to complete their circuits, and this gave rise to typical problems of conductive interference. They connected each telephone with the ground through
which the return current of electricity was carried back to the exchange. The railway companies used a single overhead trolley wire
through which the current passed to the cars and car motors and then
returned to the power house through the rails. Much of this heavy
current, however, left the rails and escaped into the earth, some entering the ground wires of the telephones in the neighborhood, which
produced a humming noise, making the voice of the speaker unintelligible. There were three principal ways of remedying this trouble.
The railway company could erect a second overhead trolley wire to
carry the return current to the power house, and in this manner none
of the current would reach the ground and interfere with the telephone circuit, but this method was very expensive. The telephone
company, by running a return wire from each telephone directly
back to the exchange, could eliminate the interference, but this was
equally costly. A third alternative was the so-called McCluer system. This consisted of the use of a common return wire for a number of telephones in a neighborhood where the interference existed.
The McCluer system had the advantage of being far less expensive
than the others, while giving satisfactory results.
Most of the decisions to date have been made in cases involving
conductive interference, and this phase of the problem is therefore
important to an understanding of the early cases. It is equally true,
however, that this type of interference has been largely eliminated
and that the modern problems are chiefly those of inductive interference, due especially to the construction of high tension power lines.
A typical case of interference by induction is that caused by overhead trolley wires carrying powerful currents coming in relative
proximity to telephone wires. The passage of an electric current
through a wire creates a magnetic field of force about it. Fluctuations in this current produce in another wire which is placed in the
magnetic field and parallel to the first, an electric current which
varies in strength with the proximity of the wires and the strength of
the current in the first wire. Currents thus produced in telephone or
(844)

NOTES

telegraph wires have a tendency to produce false signals. The elimination of this type of interference usually requires a relocation of the
wires of one or the other of the companies.'
One of the earliest major disputes between these services was
the case of Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United Electric Ry. Co. 2 This was a bill in equity to enjoin the use of electricity
by the street railways of Nashville under any system which made use
of the earth for its return circuit. The court dismissed the request
for an injunction because it was not shown that the two services could
not exist together in harmony if the telephone company installed the
McCluer system. The only remaining question was whether the telephone company must bear the expense of making this change, because
the fact that this was the best practical solution of the problem did not
necessarily mean that the railway company was not liable for the
damage. The court laid down the general rule that where one is
making a lawful and careful use of his property, or of a franchise
granted to him by the municipality, he is not liable for the damage
which such use causes to another. The court said that something
in the nature of an abuse of franchise must be shown in this
case in order to make the injury actionable, but in the absence of this,
it is daimnum absque injuria.3 Why was the defendant not liable
for maintaining a nuisance? The plaintiff did suffer peculiar damage of a continuous and substantial nature, and it was generally held
at common law that no allegation of lack of care was necessary. 4 It
was stated in the course of the opinion that there were some cases in
which liability was imposed for maintaining a nuisance merely on the
ground of the injury suffered by the neighbor, and regardless
'For a thorough discussion of the physical problem involved, as well as
some discussion of its legal aspects, see WRIGHT & PUCHSTEIN, TELEPHONE
Co muNIcATI N (1925) 425. For articles on the general legal problem involved, see annotation to Phillipay v. Pacific Power & Light Company, 23 A.
L. R. 1251 (1923); Ann. Cas. 1916 A, 135; Croswell, Conflicting Rights of
Telephone Lines and Single Trolley Electric Railways in the Highways (1896)
9 HARV. L. REV. 493; CURTIS, THE LAiw OF ELECTRICITY (1915) 513; DEIsER,
LAW OF CONFLICTING USE OF ELEcrcrrY AND EcTROLYSIs (1911) passim;
(1920) 34 HARv. L. REV. 331.
2 42 Fed. 273 (C. C. Tenn. 189o).
'Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453 (1886), was
cited with approval. In that case it was held that a coal company could drain
the water from its mines so that it followed a stream and made it entirely
unfit for use by the lower riparian owners, on the ground that the enjoyment
of the use of the water must give way to the interests of the community in
developing a natural resource. Among other cases cited by the court is Transportation Company v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635 (878), in which it was held that
a municipal corporation, in building a bridge across a river, was not liable for
damages unavoidably caused to adjoining property by obstructing the river.
Also Easton v. Railroad Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 49 (1873), where a railroad was
held not liable for damage caused by building a bridge under statutory authority.
'See Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (11) 59 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 298, 309.
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of the care exercised by the owner in the use of the property.5 However, the court disposed of these cases by attempting to show that
there was some element of lack of care present, even though the cases
were not decided on that ground.6 In short, the court proceeded on
the authority of cases like Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, which
is generally considered as carrying non-liability for a nuisance very
far.r Applying these rules to the case before it, it was decided that
the single overhead trolley was a proper use of the railway's franchise
and that the telephone company must bear the expense of remedying
the injury suffered therefrom, which was the cost of installing the
McCluer system. The keynote of this early case was damnum absque
injuria.
The next important case was Railway Co. v. Telegraph Association." This was also a suit to enjoin an electric street railway and
to recover damages suffered. The opinion of the court was that the
dominant purpose of the streets was to facilitate travel and transportation and an occupation for any other purpose wis inferior to the
public's easement for highway purposes. The statute authorizing
the telephone company also contained the prohibition that it should
not incommode the public in the use of the streets. So the court held
that the telephone company's right to use the streets was subservient
to the public enjoyment of a new mode of conveyance on the streets
such as the electric railway and that the telephone company could
therefore not complain of injury suffered from a properly operated
street railway. The plaintiff's argument that it had a vested interest
in the use of its property as it then operated it, which could not be impaired, was disapproved on the ground that the legislature could revise
the plaintiff's grant at any time for the public benefit. The injunction
and damages were refused. In this case the court advances an entirely different ground for non-liability than in the previous case,
-namely, the dominant franchise of the railway in the use of the
streets.9
'Reinhardt v. Mentasti, 42 Ch. D. 685 (1889). In that case the court held
that it would interfere to protect the plaintiff where the defendants had put up
-a stove, the heat of which rendered the cellar of the adjoining house unfit for
storing wine, because it caused annoyance to the plaintiff, even though the
-defendants were acting reasonably in the use of their house.
'For example, Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868), was called
to the court's attention. In that case water from the defendant's reservoir
burst into an old mine shaft not known to be beneath it and later found its
way into the plaintiff's mine and flooded it. The court held the defendant
liable for the reason that where one brings something upon his land which is
likely to do mischief if it escapes, he keeps it there at his peril. But the court
in the principal case explained this case on the ground that the defendant
,created a condition that he could have anticipated might injure his neighbor.
'Op. cit. supra note 4, at 389, note.
148 Ohio 390, 27 N. E. 89o (i8gi).
' Cumberland Telephone & Tel. Co. v. United Electric Ry. Co., supra note
2, was cited in the briefs of counsel, but does not appear in the opinion of the
court.
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Then the New York Court of Appeals decided Hudson River
Telephone Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike Co.10 After deciding that the
railway was within its statutory powers in using electricity for motive power, again the court said that inasmuch as the plaintiff's franchise was in its entirety subservient to the use of the streets for
travel, it could not complain of loss suffered from this mode of locomotion. There were pertinent dicta, however, to the effect that if
the defendant were not protected by its dominant franchise, then the
discharge of electricity in such volume, if continued, would likely
have constituted a servitude upon the plaintiff's private property
which could not be imposed without compensation. While the holding of this case is in accord with the Ohio case on the theory of the
dominant franchise of the street railway, its dicta indicating liability
if common law tort principles alone were involved seem contrary to
the Cumberland Telephone Co. case, which was decided on the doctrine of damnuun absque injuria.
In 1894, a second case of Cumberland Telegraph & Telephone
Co. v. United Electric Ry. Co." was decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court. The statute under which the telephone company operated, providing that its lines along the highways should not obstruct
their ordinary use, was the same as the one in the previous case in the
Federal court.12 The court decided that the railway company was not
liable for injury by induction in so far as this was a result of the
telephone company having its wires on the streets, since to that extent they were an obstruction of the use of the streets for transportation purposes which was contrary to the statute. But it was said
that the injury by conduction occurred on the plaintiff's private property and that of its subscribers, and therefore could be treated apart
from any question of the dominant right in the use of the highways.
As to this, the court held that the interference with the plaintiff's use
of its property was not merely an incidental injury but a substantial
one, and that compensation must be made for the cost of installing the
McCluer device. So we find that as to that part of the case which
was decided on tort principles alone, the holding is opposed to that
in the first Tennessee case.
The above four decisions laid the foundation for the rules applied
in the American courts. A comparison of the cases reveals a considerable difference of opinion as to the principles applicable to this
type of case. The principle of damnum absque injuria in the absence
of negligence was advanced in one, while the theory of subservient
franchise was the basis of the other decisions, the last predicating liability even in the absence of negligence, where the right of dominant
franchise was absent.
Next in point of time came two English cases. In National Tele135 N. Y. 393, 32 N. E. 148 (x892).
93 Tenn. 492, 29 S. W. 104 (1894).

"Supra note

2.
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phone Co. v. Baker,1 3 the railway's charter expressly prohibited it
from using electricity in such a manner as to affect the operation of
the telegraphic lines of the Postmaster General. The court said by
way of dictum that the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,4 predicating
liability without fault for injury resulting from the escape of unnatural substances brought on the land, applied to electricity as used
by the defendant in this case. But the court held that the English
rule was that where one was in the reasonable exercise of statutory
authority, he is not liable even for a nuisance. And it was held that
the single trolley system was within a reasonable exercise of the statutory authority and so the defendant was not liable. But it was said
by way of dictum that it was no defense for the railway to object that
the plaintiff had not installed the McCluer device. The reason given
was that the fact that one is making an extraordinary use of his property does not prevent him from recovering for injury suffered from a
neighbor's similar use of property. Nor is the former bound to adopt
extraordinary precautions. This case then propounds a new reason
for non-liability, namely statutory immunity.
The second important English case was Eastern& South African
Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Cos. 5 The important difference in facts between this and the first English case was that the
railway had extended its lines beyond where they were authorized by
statute and some of the interference was caused by this extension.
It was contended by the plaintiff that as to this part the railway was
liable under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher. But the court held that
only those making an ordinary use of property were protected by the
rule in that case and that the plaintiff here could not enhance the defendant's liability by putting his own property to an extraordinary use
requiring special protection. It is seen that the limitation put on the
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher in this case nullifies to a considerable ex[1893] 2 Ch. 186.
In England the principle of the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, supra note
5, is followed. That principle is that one who brings something on his property
which is not naturally there, and which is harmless to others so long as it is
confined to his own property, but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets
on his neighbor's property, should be obliged to make good the damage which
ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. The only
difference in facts necessary to make out a case under this rule and to make
out a case for a nuisance, is that in the latter the condition must be continuously injurious and interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of property.
In the former continuity of injury is not requisite, nor need there be a direct
projection of force on to the plaintiff's property for in that event trespass
would lie. In none of the cases are ignorance of the condition or exercise of
diligence of any avail to the defendant to avoid liability. Supra note 4.
While this principle has been approved in many American jurisdictions,
only a very small number of the cases have presented a state of facts requiring
its application to determine the liability of the defendant. In most of the cases
the defendant had initially created a condition injurious to the plaintiff, and
which would make him liable even in jurisdictions which repudiate the rule.
Supra note 4 at 433.
1 [19o2] A. C. 381.
14
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tent its modem application, because the so-called extraordinary uses,
those which are not common in an agricultural civilization, are rapidly
becoming the common uses of today. This view could not have been
the generally accepted one because it is flatly opposed to the dictum in
the National Telephone Co. case. We find from these cases that while
the English courts reach the result of non-liability of the railways as
the majority of the American courts have done, yet the reasons advanced differ. In these electrical interference cases the facts necessary
to make out a case under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher are about the
same as those necessary to constitute a nuisance. But we find the
English court setting an arbitrary limit in the application of its rule
with the idea of an extraordinary use, while the American courts tend
to require a strong case to make out a nuisance and otherwise hold
the injury to be damnum absque injuria.
The next American case was Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Chicago Ry.
Co.1- The plaintiff steam railroad brought a bill to enjoin the electric
railway from operating until it could install apparatus to prevent the
interference with its electric signal system. Here both parties were
operating on private rights of way. The court held that as between
two parties both making an extraordinary use of property, lawfully
under statutory authority, damage suffered by the one without the
fault of the other does not amount to a nuisance or interference with
the use of property without redress, but is damnum absque injuria.
We find in this case a superimposing of the doctrine of extraordinary
use propounded in the Cape Town Tramnways case upon the application of dainnum absque injuria as in the first Tennessee case. This
addition seems to have had the effect of settling the non-uniformity
found in the earlier American cases on the question whether the damage suffered by the telephone companies rose to the gravity of an
actionable servitude in property or not. There seems to be no logical
reason why this should be an additional ground for non-liability. Why
should those who are making practical developments of new scientific
discoveries be penalized with a partial withdrawal of the protection of
the laws? Whatever the answer to this may be, the fact remains that
many of the later American cases quote this combined view from the
opinion of the Indiana case and reach the fairly uniform conclusion
that nothing but want of due care in regard to the telephone companies' property is actionable.' 7 An example of what has been held
48 Ind. App. 584, 92 N. E. 989 (I9ii).

a'This first Indiana case was closely followed by another, Citizens Telephone Co. v. Ft. Wayne Ry. Co., 53 Ind. App. 230, IOO N. E. 3o9 (1912).

The

court adhered strictly to the rule that there could be no liability without negligence and that any rule to the contrary laid down by the court in the second
Tennessee case was not law in this state. But the court said that it found a
tendency in the modern decisions to adjust conflicting rights and that a mere
legislative grant would not excuse from the want of due regard for the rights
of others. So it might be made to appear in this case that the defendant failed
properly to restrict its currents, but that this did not appear in the pleadings.
In the first of the Indiana cases and now in the case of Dakota Central
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to constitute such want of due care is found in the case of Yamhill
County Telephone Co. v. Yamhill Electric Co.18 The plaintiff sought
to enjoin the power company on two grounds, first, because of the
inductive interference which would result from operating a new power
line on the same highway as the plaintiff's line, and second, because
the defendant was connecting this new line to an old line which was
in poor condition, and which would interfere with the plaintiff's line
by conduction.

The court held that the interference from the new

line was not actionable, but that resulting from the negligent use of
the old line was actionable and it must be modernized.
Probably the most recent case is that of Postal Telegraph-Cable
Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,19 decided in California in 1927. The
telephone company complained that the terrific inductive interference
from the defendant's high tension power line constituted a nuisance
and on this ground it obtained an order from the Railroad Commission on the defendant to pay half the expense of relocating the plaintiff's line outside the zone of interference. Action was later commenced in court to recover damages for past injury. The majority of
the court adopted the orthodox view of non-liability where there was
no negligence.

Two members of the court dissented on the ground

Telephone Co. v. Spink County Power *Co., 42 S. Dak. 448, 176 N. W. 143
(1920), we come to the first of the cases where interference was due to high
tension transmission lines. The chief source of injury here is by induction.
This case is interesting for the construction put on the statute involved. The
power company's right to use the highway was under a statute which provided
that the "transmission line shall not interfere with the service of any telephone
• . . lines already coistructed on the highway." The court took note of
the fact that at the time that the statute was passed most telephone companies,
as the one in this case, were operating with a ground return. The court reasoned that it must have been the legislature's intention to protect telephone
companies in their use of that method and the defendant must pay for the
installation of the metallic return which it had made necessary. The statute
in the above case was worded to the same effect as the statutes in the English
cases but a contrary result is reached.
A novel point appears in the transmission line case of Phillipay v. Pacific
Power & Light Co., 120 Wash. 581, 211 Pac. 872 (1922). Action was brought
for the cost of metallicizing plaintiff's telephone lines. The court quotes from
the opinions of the Lake Shore Ry. Co. case and the Cape Town Railways
Cos. case. The specific ground for non-liability set forth is that the telephone
company, in order to maintain its single wire system must make use of the
earth in which it has no rights, for the completion of its return circuit. And
the court concluded that it was the duty of the plaintiff to standardize its lines
in accordance with modern engineering practice in order to prevent interference. This idea, that the telephone company is not entitled to recover because it
has failed to avail itself of the most modern apparatus, is found in many of the
decisions. This principle does not seem to be legally sound. If I dam up
water on my land and it escapes and floods your land, it is no defense for me
to say that you had not protected your property by building a wall about it
sufficient to withstand the flow of water. But the courts in these cases seem
to feel that they are engaged in making practical adjustments rather than enforcing strict legal rights.
iii Or. 57, 224 Pac. io8i (1924).
126o

Pac.

1o1

(Cal. 1927).
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that the allegations did constitute a nuisance. They disagreed with
the extraordinary use doctrine. They said that the order for relocation showed that the defendant could have avoided the damage.
The policy adopted by the American courts in early times of giving to those who make an industrial use of property a wide range of
immunity from liability for incidental damages, is different from the
English law which has always strictly protected the rights attached to
property. The American policy has been a valuable expedient in the
economic development of the country. But a limitation in the efficacy
of this policy is approached at the point where the interference with
another industrial use of equal importance to the community becomes
substantial. Just when this point is reached has naturally been the
subject of much difference of opinion among the courts, especially
in the case of a new scientific development such as we are here considering, where there is no close analogy to serve as a precedent. In
these electrical interference cases, it might be said on the one hand that
the injury is substantial because the telephone company is practically
deprived of the use of its lines. But the courts have been prone to
look rather at the relatively low cost of installing apparatus which will
remedy the trouble. In considering a case like that of the Pacific
Telegraph-Cable Co., where the interference is so great that no telephone device will remedy the situation and only a relocation of the
telephone line will suffice, it seems that the limit has been passed.
Speaking of incidental damages in such a case seems absurd.
If the power company cannot carry on its business without causing
that degree of harm, then compensation therefor should be made one
of its expenses of operation. As the potentials at which transmission
lines are operated continue to increase, the situations in which nothing
but a readjustment of the conflicting franchises suffices will also become more frequent. Such adjustments will require much technical
skill and supervision. To work of this kind, the administrative commission seems better adapted than a court.
R.S.R.

THE NECESSITY OF POSSESSION BY THE MORTGAGEE TO THaE
CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF His LIEN ON UNSEVERED CROPSIn order to insure the unhampered cultivation of mortgaged property,
or, as it has been expressed, by reason of "the protection the law owes
to agriculture," I the doctrine has developed that crops planted by the
mortgagor or his tenant, and severed before the entry of the mortgagee of the real estate, belong absolutely to the mortgagor without
any liability to account for them. This doctrine is especially prevalent in the Western States where it is common, if not customary, for
farmers to finance the coming season by giving chattel mortgages on
crops already planted or yet to be planted.
1Cassilly

v. Rhodes, 12 Ohio 88 (1843).
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Two cases recently decided by the Supreme Court of Montana 2
involve the rights of parties growing out of mortgages of land on
which crops were subsequently planted. The first was a contest between a real and a chattel mortgagee for a crop grown on the mortgaged premises. The realty mortgage contained a provision entitling
the mortgagee to immediate possession with the right to receive the
rents, issues, and profits on exercising his option to declare the entire
debt due and payable if any note secured were not payed at maturity.
The mortgagor then gave a chattel mortgage on his share, as landlord,
of a crop put in by a tenant. After default, and while the crop was
still standing, the realty mortgagee elected to consider the debt due,
started an action to recover possession, filed notice of lis pendens,
and notified the parties that he was then the owner and entitled to
immediate possession of the crop then growing. But possession was
refused and the tenant severed the crop before the realty mortgagee
gained actual possession. This action followed foreclosure proceedings begun by the chattel mortgagee. It was held that the realty
mortgagee had the right to create a lien on the mortgagor's share of
the crop,3 but that actual and continued possession of the land was
essential to the creation and maintenance of such lien as against that
of the chattel mortgagee. 4 The second case involved a contest between the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and the mortgagor and his
tenant. In this case the mortgagee commenced foreclosure proceedings and secured a default judgment and an order of sale which provided that the purchaser at such sale be let into immediate possession.
At the time of the sale the crop was still standing. Surrender of possession was refused upon demand made by the purchaser, and the
crop was not severed until the day before the tenant was actually
ousted by the sheriff, under a writ of assistance. It was held, that
the purchaser was not entitled to the crop, he having failed to acquire
actual possession of the land before severance.
At some stage of the proceedings the mortgagor loses his right
to sever the crop and appropriate it to his own use without liability to
account to the mortgagee, and the problem in both cases is to ascertain
when this point is reached.
A preliminary question to be considered is whether or not effect
will be given to a provision in a mortgage which purports to give the
mortgagee the right to possession at a time prior to that at which he
would be entitled to possession in the normal course of foreclosure
proceedings. In jurisdictions where there is no statute to the contrary, there appears to be no sound reason why the parties may not
'Morton v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 261 Pac. 278 (Mont. 1927);
Kester v. Amon, 261 Pac. 288 (Mont. 1927).
'The court was not called on to decide the rights of the realty mortgagee
as against the tenant, as the latter's rights were not involved in this action.
'The necessity of actual and continued possession to the creation and maintenance of the realty mortgagee's lien on the crops as against the mortgagor was
not involved in this case, and the court definitely refused to express any opinion
on that point.
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make such provision as they like in reference to possession, whether
the mortgage be regarded as a lien or a conveyance. Though there
is some authority to the contrary,5 such provisions are usually held
valid and will be given effect.8 However, statutes providing that the
mortgagee is not entitled to recover possession without foreclosure
and sale have been held to invalidate provisions for taking possession
and receiving rents and profits before foreclosure.7 But in so far as
the two principal cases are concerned the point may be granted, since
in the same jurisdiction it was held that a similar provision in a
mortgage was valid, notwithstanding a statute which entitled a mortgagor to possession until foreclosure, since the statute, it was held,
was designed to apply only to those mortgages which were silent as
regards possession." Thus, an agreement that, upon default, the
mortgagee might take possession,9 or take possession and receive the
rents and 1rofits, 10 is valid. Such an agreement was held, in a New
York case,11 to be an agreement between the parties as to when the
rents and profits should become security for the debt.
The foregoing have been mentioned for the purpose of showing
that the mortgagor may create a lien on rents and profits before foreclosure, and one method of doing so is by provision in the mortgage
authorizing the mortgagee to take possession upon default. Rights of
parties in respect to growing crops and in respect to rents and profits
are corelated, inasmuch as possession is made a determinative factor
as regards each. That is to say, a mortgagee permitted to recover rents
and profits over a period during which he did not have actual possession would also be entitled to any crops standing during the same
period, since it is supposed that possession is an essential element in
either case. So, if a provision in a mortgage entitling the mortgagee
to possession before foreclosure is effective to entitle the mortgagee
to rents and profits from the time agreed upon, it must also be effective
to terminate the right of the mortgagor to sever the crops after that
time. But the right given to the mortgagee does not vest automatically
without some action on his part to acquire the possession as provided
in the mortgage. 12 Thd mortgagee, it is held, must take some action
to acquire possession in order to prevent a subsequent lien from acquiring priority."" It was held in Dow v. Memphis & Little Rock
'Cheever v. Rutland & Burlington RR., 39 Vt. 653 (1867).
'Loughridge v. Haugen, 69 Ill. App. 644 (1898); Hubbell v. Avenue Investment Co., 97 Iowa I35, 66 N. W. 85 (1896).
'Union Trust Co. v. Charlotte General Electric Co., 152 Mich. 568, ii6
N. W. 379 (i9o8) ; Walford v. Cook, 71 Minn. 77, 73 N. W. 706 (1898).
'Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 74 Mont. 70, 237 Pac. 518 (1925).
'Felino v. Newcomb Lumber Co., 64 Neb. 335, 89 N. W. 755 (902).
"McIntyre v. Whitfield, 21 Miss. 88 (1849).
Bryson v. Jones, 23 Jones & S. 374 (Super. Ct. City of N. Y. 1888).
, 2 See note in 4 A. L. R. 14O8 (i98).
'It re Clark Realty Co., 234 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 7th, 1916) ; Johnston v.
Riddle, 7o Ala. 219 (I88I).
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R. R., 1 4 that a demand for possession by bringing a suit to enforce a
surrender in accordance with the terms of the mortgage vests the rents
and profits in the mortgagee, and thereafter the mortgagor must
account, and that it makes no difference that a receiver was not appointed until afterwards.
In the principal cases, in holding that the mortgagor had the
right to sever the crops after default and demand made, the court is
not only refusing to follow the law with respect to the analogous
problem of "rents and profits," but in the first case the court is also
failing to give effect to the intention of the parties manifested in their
agreement. In attempting to give effect to the expressed intention,
it is not difficult to understand why the court should require the
mortgagee to take affirmative action for the purpose of acquiring
possession, especially when the default does not necessarily work a
forfeiture, but only at the option of the mortgagee. But it is difficult
to understand why a demand for possession made on the mortgagor,
or those in possession under him, is not sufficient to deprive the mortgagor and his tenant of the right to sever the crop, and why the
crop standing at that time does not become a part of the security
covered by the mortgage. It would seem clear that neither the mortgagor nor the chattel mortgagee, who is limited to the interest which
the mortgagor has, should be permitted a claim based on the former's
wrongful refusal to surrender possession, in violation of his agreement.
In answer to the argument urged by counsel in the second case,
that the demand was equivalent to securing actual possession, the
court drew an analogy to a demand made on one in adverse possession. A mere demand made on one in adverse possession would not,
it is true, interrupt the running of the prescriptive period. Granting
that the analogy is sound in the second case, where there was no express provision as regards possession save as contained in the order
for sale, the analogy does not seem sound when the right to immediate possession arises from express provision in the mortgage. In
this case, while it is true that the party in possession wrongfully remains in possession, yet he differs from the adverse possessor in that
he is in contractual relation with the one entitled to possession. Assuming the second case to be correct, the first case could be distinguished on this ground.
The distinction suggested has been
recognized. It was held in Douglass v. Cline 15 that rents and profits
(or possession) are not vested automatically in the mortgagee by a
general suit to foreclose and a decree for sale therein, even if a receiver is asked for and appointed, if the receiver is not a receiver by
virtue of the special contract, but such as a court of equity always
appoints in a proper case. The inference, of course, is that the rents
and profits, which do not ordinarily vest in the mortgagee until pos-

U. S. 652 (1888).
i75 Ky. 673 (1877).
14 124
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session is taken by him or by one acting for him, would have vested
automatically in the mortgagee had the appointment of the receiver
been in furtherance of the express provision in the mortgage. Had
the majority of the court felt that the receiver was appointed by virtue of the agreement, then rents and profits would have passed from
that time, because that is when the parties intended that it should
pass. Applying this reasoning to the first case, the question suggests
itself, that if the right to sever the crop without liability to account
and to retain rents and profits continues until possession is acquired,
why is it that "full performance" on the part of the mortgagee does
not terminate the right of the mortgagor to sever the crops to the
detriment of the real estate mortgagee, at least in jurisdictions which
purport to give effect to such stipulations in mortgages? The mortgagee
of the realty has equities growing out of his agreement which should
not be ignored and which, in some cases, have been specifically enforced. It is submitted that the result reached in the first case fails
to give effect to the intention of the parties as clearly expressed in the
mortgage.
On the other hand, it might be argued that the analogy drawn
between the right to growing crops and that to rents and profits is not
valid, because sound economic policy demands that the rights of a
chattel mortgagee to crops be treated differently from those of the
mortgagor to rents and profits. Perhaps such considerations influenced the court in the first case. However, it is submitted that legally
the analogy is sound, and that changes in the law, demanded by economic consideration, are properly left to the legislature. 1 If economic factors influenced the court in its decision, it did so at the
expense of ignoring the legal rights of the mortgagor of the real
estate.
There is some authority for the result reached in the second
case,1 7 but it is contrary to the general rule that the purchaser at a
foreclosure sale is entitled to the crops growing at the time of the
sale in preference to the mortgagor or anyone claiming under him
whose claim originated subsequently to the mortgage."' Injunctions
have been granted, pending the confirmation of the sale, restraining
the mortgagor or those claiming under him, from meddling with the
crops.1 9 Before confirmation, it is held, the purchaser's title is insufficient to enable him to maintain replevin for crops severed by one
in possession, 0 but upon confirmation the title relates back, and entitles the purchaser to crops from the time of the sale. 21 A purchaser
Act,

"' In this regard, see the provisions of the Uniform
PART
I § 2 (2), quoted infra p. 856.
7
" JONES, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) § 1658.

Real Estate Mortgage

IsIbid.
"Frink v. Roe, 70 Cal. 296, 11 Pac. 820 (I886); Missouri Land Co. v.
Barwick, 5o Kan. 57, 31 Pac. 685 (1892).
"Woehler v. Endter, 46 Wis. 3Ol, 5o N. W. io99 (1879).
'Ruggles v. First Nat. Bank, 43 Mich. 192, 5 N. W. 257 (1880).

856

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

may maintain trespass against the mortgagor or his lessee for taking
them and carrying them away. Due to the great diversity of effect
given to mortgages in the various jurisdictions, comprehensive statements regarding any particular phase of mortgage law must be of
doubtful accuracy, but the rules above stated appear to be uniform in
jurisdictions which consider the mortgage as passing the legal title.
In connection with the rule in jurisdictions which consider the mortgage as a lien, it was said in a leading New York case on the subject 2
that there is no reason why the doctrine relating to emblements should
in any way be affected, though the mortgage be considered a lien only,
or a chose in action secured by a lien.
According to the Uniformn Real Estate Mortgage Act, submitted
by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and
approved by the American Bar Association in September, 1927, both
cases would doubtless be decided as they were, but only, it is submitted, because this Act changes the common law. In this Act 28 it is
provided that ". . . the mortgage gives no right to possession or to the
rents and profits of the mortgaged premises to the mortgagee or purchaser at the foreclosure sale until it is foreclosed and the period of
redemption has expired, even though the mortgage contains a conveyance, or agreement for possession by the mortgagee, or pledge of
the rents and profits, or any other provision to the contrary."
S.D.B.
THE EFFECT ON ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS OF AGREEMENTS
FOR A PERIODIC SETTLEMENT OF AccouNTs-The general proposi-

tion is well established that there can be no action between members
of a partnership over matters involving the firm's transactions without a bill in equity for final accounting and dissolution.' This rule,
of course, does not apply to suits not involving the partnership's business, as on an individual note 2 from one partner to his fellow, a
personal loan or a tort liability, for here the court may decide the
parties' rights in the particular litigation involved without going into
an investigation of the partnership accounts.2 The reason for the
rule is obvious. Without a final accounting it is impossible to say
whether, considering the whole of the partnership transactions, the
defendant is really indebted to the plaintiff; and without a dissolution
it may be that, but a moment after the decree is rendered, further firm
Batterman v. Albright, 122 N. Y. 484, 25 N. E. 856 (189o).
SPART I § 2 (2).

'Springer v. Cabell, io Mo. 64o (1847); Bailey v. Bancker, 3 Hill 188
(N. Y. 2842); Spear v. Newell, 13 Vt. 288 (1841).
'Willis v. Barron, 143 Mo. 450, 45 S. W. 289 (1896). Contra, Stafford

v. Fargo, 35 Ill. 481 (1864).
'See collection of cases, RoWLEY,
1034, note 42.

MODERN LAw OF PARTNERSHIP

(1916)
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activities may have altered the obligations of the litigants. In addition to these reasons, the courts seem to be influenced by the consideration that if two partners have been unable to settle their differences
in one dispute without resort to court action, further friction and ultimate failure are sure to ensue.
However, there seems to exist a recognized though seldom discussed exception to this rule. Several decisions, including a few of
quite recent date, indicate that if the partners have agreed to a periodic
settlement of their accounts, either in the articles of agreement or
subsequently, an action can be maintained by one against the other
without winding up the firm's business. Seemingly the point first
arose 4 in Patterson v. Ware,5 which held that where a partnership was formed to buy and sell land, and a bill was filed to compel a division of proceeds from land already sold, division would
be ordered without a sale of the land still owned by the firm. The
court implied an agreement to divide the proceeds after each sale and
assumed that such an agreement would have the legal effect they desired. The facts were simple and the land still held by the firm
had been paid for by both parties. The reason for the rule requiring
dissolution and final adjustment, namely that such steps are necessary
to determine whether the defendant is really indebted to the plaintiff
after all the business is balanced, was not considered of importance
here, for all the land had been bought from money of both parties
and all that remained to be done was to sell and divide the proceeds.
The court said that no future transactions could make the plaintiff
liable to the defendant for matters of firm business.6 The case, however, was taken as a precedent for several later decisions in which the
facts were not so simple, and has
7 been generally quoted in the texts
as sustaining a broad principle.
A case of the Supreme Court of the United States s held that
in pursuance of an agreement to settle at a certain time, the administrator of one partner in a law firm might maintain a bill for that part
of the assets which were then due him, in spite of the probability that
it would take several years to completely wind up the business. In a
case on quite similar facts involving a banking partnership, the United
'An early Louisiana case, Rondear v. Pedesclaux, 3 La. 510 (832), had
already held that, where a note was given from one partner to another, for a
share of the profits, which should have been distributed at an agreed time,
recovery could be had on the note. The intimation was that an action for the
share of profits would have been entertained irrespective of the note.
6io Ala. 444 (1846). But another land partnership case on like facts
held that no action would lie and intimated a final accounting and settlement
was necessary if any remedy were to be enforced. Mogart v. Smouse, io3
Md. 463, 63 Atl. io7o (i9o6).
'Evidently the possibility that one partner might become indebted to the
other for payments of taxes, assessments, or improvements was disregarded.
'BATES,

PARTNERSHIP

(1888) §§ 9io-9i6.

"Denver v. Roane, 99 U. S. 355 (1878).
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States Circuit Court 9 allowed the plaintiff's bill. Professor Pomeroy
also reaches the conclusion
that an exception to the general rule exists
10
in this class of cases.
The decisions just considered have dealt with usual business or
professional partnerships. An inquiry into the field of the unique
enterprise known as the "mining partnership," to see if there may be
an action between the members without a dissolution, is interesting.
It must be borne in mind that the unusual needs of mining have rendered the mining partnership sui generis and led to its prevalence in
every community where this work is carried on."
In brief, this
hybrid differs from the ordinary business partnership in that the
delectus personw is absent, and that the sale of partnership shares
(even without consent or knowledge of the other members) or their
transfer by devolution, does not terminate nor even interrupt the
firm's activity, but merely constitutes the transferee a partner in place
of his transferor. 2 As a general rule, this form of partnership also
requires a final accounting and dissolution if there is to be any remedy
allowed one member against his fellow.13 But here too, the tendency
to permit a recovery without going the whole way of dissolving the
business where there is an agreement calling for settlements at stated
times is making itself felt, and one may venture the conjecture, in
spite of a scarcity of decisions, that courts will continue to decree less
than a dissolution of the firm in cases presenting similar facts.
A recent mining partnership case of the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals 14 contained dicta that an action at law could be maintained
without final accounting and dissolution by one mining partner, if the
articles of agreement called for periodic settlements. It seemed somewhat weakened, perhaps, by the additional comment that the partnership was practically dissolved anyhow. Unfortunately this case,
like the others which discuss the point, gives little study to the problem, but dismisses it without appreciable consideration of authority.
However, it is submitted more reason for allowing a partial accounting is found in the case of a mining partnership than in the ordinary
business venture.
A very recent case, Gilbert v. Fontaine,5 held that such an action
would lie, saying:
'Brew v. Cochran, 141 Fed. 459 (M. D. Pa. 19o5).
"PoMERoY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. I919) § 2666. The author's
statement, however, seems to rest solely on the decision of one case, Miller v.

Freemen, ii Ga. 654, 36 S. E. 961 (19oo).
" Kahn v. Central Smelting Co., 1O2 U. S. 641 (188o).
"For discussion of the nature of mining partnerships see Gray, Mining
Partnerships, (1924) 3 Wis. L. REv. 12. For collection of cases distinguish- .
ing mining partnerships from other forms of joint enterprise, see Sturm v.
Ulrich, io F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
'Childers v. Neely, 47 W. Va. 70, 34 S.E. 828 (1899) ; Boehme v. Fitzgerald, 43 Mont. 226, 115 Pac. 413 (911).
" Indiahoma Co. v. Wood, 255 S.W. 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
is22 F. (2d) 657 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
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"We think that, in mining partnerships, since they are not
dissolved by bankruptcy or by death or by transfer of a partner's
interest and since the delectus persona,is absent, the rules in regard to actions between partners are even more liberal than in
ordinary commercial partnerships."
This case arose from a bill in equity seeking to enforce a lien on
a mining partner's proceeds from oil wells, for his share of expenses
paid by the plaintiff in operating the property. 16 Articles of agreement made by the parties' respective assignors 17 provided for periodic
settlements, but the defendant contended there could be no relief
given without a decree for final accounting and winding-up of partnership business. It was held tlat the court of equity could give a
decree for the plaintiff without such final accounting and dissolution.
The case is squarely in point, but it is not made clear in the opinion
whether the conclusion is reached on the mere fact that a mining
partnership is concerned, or that regular times for settlement were
provided, or on positions and admissions of counsel in the argument,
or on the combination of these elements. The few authorities cited
by the court would imply the most weighty argument was the agreement for settlements.
There is no question but that the rigid rule requiring complete
dissolution even in business partnership is being undermined.' 8 Where
the partners are unable to agree and perpetual friction will result,
where circumstances show a dissolution is inevitable, the rule is doubtless justified. Forcing two persons who are predetermined to quarrel
to continue as associates is an open invitation to trouble."" But if it
appears that there is a reasonable chance that the partners can successfully continue their business in the future, and particularly if they
do not desire a complete dissolution, it would seem far more to their
mutual benefit as well as to the benefit of the business world to permit the firm to continue. It has been suggested that it is most ludicrous to compel a dissolution of the firm in order to settle a dispute
between its members when the parties may, if they choose, on the very
next day reunite and form a new partnership.
I.F.H.
One partner has a lien on any proceeds of the firm accruing to his fellow
for contributions due him by reason of expenses paid out. Connoly v. Bouck,
174 Fed. 312 (C. C. A. 8th, i9og), certiorari denied 220 U. S. 61o (1gio);
Indiahoma Co. v. Wood, suepra note 13.
" One purchasing or acquiring shares in a mining partnership takes subject
to all the rights and liabilities of his transferor. He is not liable personally,
however, for debts existing before he acquired the shares, GRAY, oP. cit. sulra

note

12.

"' For a collection of the leading cases in which exceptions were recognized, see 5 AM. & ENG. DEC. iN EQurry og-ilO.
" Childres v. Neely, supra note 13.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA ACT REGULATING

OWNERSHIP OF PHARMACiEs-The principles used to determine
whether state legislation is valid under the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution are, today, well settled, but their application is
attended with difficulty. The accepted rule is that a statute passed as
an exercise of the police power must not be arbitrary., A statute is
arbitrary when it bears no substantial relation to the purported object.
The uncertainty in applying these propositions is demonstrated by
the jagged line drawn by the United States Supreme Court in the
mass of decisions handed down since 1868, in so many of which the
tribunal was divided in opinion.2 In 1927, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed an Act 3 regulating the ownership of drug stores, which
provided that, (I) All drug stores thereafter opened may be owned
only by a registered pharmacist. (2) Where the ownership vests in
a partnership or corporation, all members thereof must be registered
pharmacists. (3) Present owners of existing drug stores are permitted to remain in business at present locations, but they may not
open additional stores. (4) Administrators and executors are permitted, although not registered pharmacists, to run drug stores for
the period necessary to wind up the estate. (5) The Act does not
apply to stores not running a prescription counter. (But under prior
acts 4 such stores may not display the sign "drug store" or "pharmacy.")
This statute survived its first attack when in the case of Louis K.
Liggett & Co. v. Balbridge 5 a special court consisting of two district
and one circuit court judges, dismissed a bill for an injunction and
1

Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504 (1924); Weaver v. Palmer
270 U. S. 402 (1926).
'Illustrations of state statutes declared arbitrary are: Weaver v. Palmer
Bros. Co., supra note i (Statute forbidding use of shoddy in comfortables).;
Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, supra note I (Statute fixing minimum and maximum weights for bread). Illustrations of statutes declared by state courts to
be arbitrary are: Schnaier v. Navarre Hotel Co., 182 N. Y. 83, 74 N. E. 56I
(i9o5) (Act requiring master plumbing partnerships to be composed solely
of registered plumbers) ; People v. Ringe, 197 N. Y. 143, 9o N. E. 451 (1Io)
(Act requiring every member of a firm or corporation engaged in the undertaking business to be a licensed undertaker); State v. Brown, 37 Wash. 97,
79 Pac. 635 (190)
(Statute restricting ownership of dental offices to licensed
dentists). There is a dictum in Commonwealth v. Zacharias, 3 Pa. Super. 264,
274 (1897), that a state act regulating the ownership of drug stores would be
of doubtful constitutionality. With the preceding cases contrast the following
upholding statutes: Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887) (Forbidding the
sale of intoxicating liquor) ; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888)
(Forbidding the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine) ; Austin v. Tennessee,
179 U. S. 343 (900)
(Forbidding the sale of cigarettes); Booth v. Illinois,
184 U. S. 425 (1901) (Forbidding trading in futures in grain and other commodities) ; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 6o6 (I9O2) (Forbidding trading in stocks
on margin).
'Act of May 13, 1927, P. L. ioog.
' Act of 1917, P. L. 208, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) §§ 9301 et seq.; Act of
1921, P. L. 1172, PA. STAT. (West, Supp. 1924) §§ 9329a-I-9329a-4.

Bros. Co.,

522 F.

(2d)

993 (E. D. Pa.

1927).
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held the Act valid under the Fourteenth Amendment. The complainant contended that the Act was an arbitrary interference with
his freedom to engage in a common calling, because it afforded no
additional protection in a business already adequately regulated in the
interest of public health. 6
The court's finding of a substantial relationship between the
statute and its purpose was put on two grounds: First, that the
owner of a drug store controls the supply of medicines to be dispensed, and secondly, that there is a likelihood of benefit to the public
health in having ownership and management more closely associated.
The bases of the decision are not free from criticism. For instance, it may be suggested in examining the first point, that since
the Act does not compel an owner to purchase the drugs himself,
rather than through the agency of a non-pharmacist buyer or the
manager in charge, there is no assurance that the supply will be controlled by the owner. As to the second point, under the statute, a
pharmacist-owner may nevertheless employ another pharmacist to
manage his store, the owner doing no more than to count the profits.
It is questionable, therefore, if the contemplated results, assuming
their beneficial influence upon the public health, will be achieved, as a
practical matter, by this statute. On the other hand, can it be said,
dogmatically, that no good to the public health will be produced by
this Act?
It is obvious that we are here confronted with a strictly factual
problem, any decision of which will be largely a matter of mere opinion. The legislature has, after consideration,. deemed the Act appropriate to a recognized power. True, many may doubt its expediency and wisdom, but is it arbitrary in a constitutional sense?
The likelihood is that eventually the validity of the Act will come
up for determination by the Supreme Court of the country. Meanwhile, as we conjecture as to the outcome, it may be well to consider
the question put by Mr. Warren,7 "Is it, or is it not, a good thing
that the legislation enacted by each state to meet local conditions and
to regulate local relations should be standardized, by being forced to
comply to a new definition of 'liberty' applied to every state by the
judicial branch of the National Government?"
A.A.S.
'The licensing of pharmacists by a state board, the restriction of management to a single drug store for each pharmacist, and the preparation and dispensing of drugs under the personal supervision of a registered pharmacist,
are provided for in the statute cited supra note 4.
"Warren, The New Liberty Under the Fourteenth Atendment (1926) 39
H, v. L. REV. 431, 464.

